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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS henceforth) study a game of strategic information transmis-
sion between a Sender and a Receiver. The Receiver needs to take some action but is poorly
informed about the state of the world. The Sender is perfectly informed about the state of
the world but his ideal choice in each state di¤ers from the Receivers preferred choice. The
Receiver asks the Sender for advice and then takes whichever action he likes best after having
heard the Senders advice. CS show that all equilibria of this game are essentially equivalent
to interval partition equilibria, where the Sender divides the type space into subintervals and
all Sender types within the same subinterval pool on the same message, thereby inducing
the same Receiver action.
This paper provides new conditions for uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number
of Receiver actions and comparative statics results with respect to changes in the distribution
of types. Both questions are intimately tied together. The known su¢ cient conditions for
uniqueness are joint restrictions on preferences and information. As I explain in detail in
section 2.3 below, this is ne as long as the distribution is kept constant. However, when the
distribution is varied - as I do in the comparative statics part of the paper - then this approach
becomes problematic, as the comparative statics exercise itself may expand the equilibrium
set. Therefore, it is useful to have separate conditions on the utility function and on the
distribution of types that jointly ensure uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of
actions. I show that uniqueness of equilibria is guaranteed when the Receiver has preferences
that make his optimal choice respond less than or at most one for one with increases in
the state and the distribution has a logconcave density. The preferences form a natural
class containing quadratic loss functions. Moreover, many well known distributions, such
as the uniform, the (truncated) normal, the (truncated) logistic, the (truncated) extreme-
value distribution, the (truncated) chi-square distribution and many more have logconcave
densities.1
1Logconcave probabilities have been studied in the economics literature by An (1998) and Bagnoli and
Bergström (2005). See Bagnoli and Bergström (2005) for the statement that the distributions listed above
have logconcave densities, for a more extensive list of distributions with a logconcave density, and for a
proof that logconcavity is preserved under truncation. It is also worth noting that logconcavity of the
density implies that hazard rates are monotone nondecreasing, a property that has found widespread uses
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The intuition for the uniqueness result is quite simple. Suppose the Receiver does not
know the state precisely, but merely knows that the state is in some interval. If the Receivers
preferences are such that he reacts (weakly) less than one for one to increases in the state if
he knows the state precisely, then, if the density is logconcave and the Receiver knows only
that the state is in some interval, the Receiver reacts (weakly) less than one for one to a
shifting of the interval. The reason is that for a logconcave density, the Receiver becomes
relatively more pessimistic about high realizations of the state in a given interval the higher
the location of the interval. I use this insight to prove uniqueness via a standard contraction
mapping argument of a suitably dened composed best reply map.
Given uniqueness of equilibria for all densities in the logconcave class, one can perform
comparative statics exercises with respect to changes in the distribution within a well studied
class. Since the equilibrium partition is not known a priori, clear-cut comparative statics
results require that the distributions can be ranked on arbitrary partitions. Building on the
property that the monotone likelihood ratio property is preserved under arbitrary trunca-
tions, I show that equilibria are higher - in the sense that all Receiver actions and all marginal
Sender types are higher - in a communication game with an upwardly biased Sender if the
distribution is higher in the likelihood ratio order (see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) on
stochastic orders). In a symmetric game where the Senders and the Receivers ideal choice
agree at the prior mean and the Senders ideal choice reacts faster to changes in the state
than the Receivers ideal choice does, I show that equilibria are more spread out - in the
sense that the Receiver actions and the marginal Sender types are farther away from the
prior mean - if the distribution is more spread out in the sense of a mean reverting monotone
likelihood ratio property.
The latter result has direct consequences for the impact of better information on equi-
librium communication. In the special case where Sender and Receiver preferences are
quadratic, both playersoptimal actions depend only on the conditional expectation of the
state conditional on the Senders information. Thus, better information impacts on equi-
librium communication through its e¤ects on the ex ante distribution of the conditional
expectation. I show that the stochastic order needed to obtain a spreading of equilibria is
consistent with notions of better information in the literature, such as riskiness of the poste-
in incentive models of contracting and mechanism design.
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rior as in Blackwell (1951), a mean preserving spread in the distribution of the conditional
expectation as in Szalay (2009), and the convex order considered in Ganuza and Penalva
(2010). Thus, advice from a better informed Sender in this sense induces the Receiver to
take actions that are more spread out. For reasons of space, I only sketch this model here,
leaving applications for future research. Moreover, the focus of this paper is entirely on pos-
itive aspects. The normative side of improvements in the quality of information is studied in
companion work (Es½o and Szalay (2012)), where we investigate, among other things, how the
marginal value of information depends on the informativeness of the communication game.
The last 30 years have witnessed an extensive body of research that has extended the
CS model in various directions, some of which - but by far not all - are mentioned below.
Most closely related to this work is Chen et al. (2008) and Gordon (2010, 2011). Chen et al.
(2008) and Gordon (2011) study renements among equilibria that induce di¤erent numbers
of Receiver actions. This paper is concerned with uniqueness of equilibria inducing the same
number of Receiver actions. Gordon (2010) develops a general xed point procedure to study
existence and stability of equilibria. I employ di¤erent techniques, that are useful to prove
uniqueness and for comparative statics purposes once it is known that an equilibrium exists,
thus complementing Gordons approach.2
Very little is known on comparative statics with respect to changes in the distribution of
types in the context of strategic information transmission. In contemporaneous and indepen-
dent work, Chen and Gordon (2012) study stochastically monotonic shifts in the distribution
of types. I am not aware of any results on spreads, nor on their connection to information
in the cheap talk context. However, dispersion orders have been used in other contexts to
capture better information. The most general discussion of stochastic orders on the distrib-
ution of conditional expectations is given by Ganuza and Penalva (2010); they apply their
results to study an auctioneers incentive to provide information to bidders. Szalay (2009)
provides conditions on the primitives of the updating process such that better information
corresponds to a more risky distribution of the conditional expectation. Inderst and Otta-
viani (2011) study an application in the context of advice; an intermediary advises customers
on which one of two products suits their preferences better. However, since there are only
two actions, the questions they address are quite di¤erent from the ones addressed here.
2See also Bognar et al (2008) for an analysis of a dynamic conversation game with logconcave distributions.
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Formalizing better information by more risky distributions allows us to analyze information
acquisition in the cheap talk game in a general way.3
Any attempt to review the literature on strategic information transmission is bound to
leave out many interesting and important contributions. Sobel (2010) provides a recent
survey of the literature, that is much more complete than the following short paragraph. To
name just a few contributions, in roughly chronological order, Battaglini (2002), Ambrus and
Takahashi (2008), Levy and Razin (2007), and most recently Chakraborty and Harbaugh
(2010) study models of multidimensional cheap talk; Dessein (2002) compares communication
to delegation; Alonso et al. (2008) inquire when coordination requires centralization; Krishna
and Morgan (2004) study communication allowing for multiple rounds of communication;
Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006) study communication by an expert who wishes to appear
well informed; Blume et al. (2007) study noisy talk; Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik
(2009) introduce costs of lying, making talk no longer cheap; Goltsmann et al. (2009) study
mediated talk; Ivanov (2012) studies informational control by the Receiver. Many exciting
questions involve changes in the distribution of types, that have -to the best of my knowledge-
not been addressed so far. So, this paper hopefully proves useful to address such questions
in future research.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section two, I introduce the model
alongside with known results about it and explain in more detail why separate conditions on
preferences and information that jointly ensure uniqueness are useful; section three discusses
impacts of changes in the stochastic structure on the Receivers optimal choice; section four
demonstrates the uniqueness result; section ve provides some comparative statics results
with respect to the distribution of types. Section six derives a statistical model that allows to
capture the notion of better information in the game of strategic information transmission
in a useful and general way. The nal section concludes. All proofs are gathered in the
appendix.
3An alternative route is to study a specic statistical model. Specic statistical models of information
acquisition in the cheap talk game are studied in Argenziano et al. (2011) (beta-binomial experiments),
Esö and Szalay (2012) (all-or-nothing information acquisition), and Arean and Szalay (2005) (normally
distributed signals and priors).
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2 The model
2.1 Setup
I analyze the strategic information transmission game by Crawford and Sobel (1982). There
are two players, a Sender and a Receiver. The Receiver needs to take an action, y: The
Receiver is uncertain about a state of the world, !; that inuences the ideal action he would
like to take. The Receiver knows only that the state ! is drawn from a distribution with
continuously di¤erentiable cdf F (!) and density f (!) > 0 on the support [0; 1] : Prior to
taking the action, the Receiver gets advice from a Sender who knows !; that is, the Sender
sends a messagem 2M to the Receiver, whereM is a rich message space. After the Receiver
has heard the Senders advice, the Receiver takes whichever action he nds optimal at that
point; thus, there is no ex ante commitment to a course of action as a function of what the
Sender says. Finally, payo¤s are realized and the game ends. The information structure is
common knowledge.
The Playersutility functions depend on the action y and the state of the world !: The
Senders utility US (y; !) and the Receivers utility UR (y; !) satisfy the following assump-
tions: for each !; there exists y such that U j1 (y; !) = 0 for j = R;S; moreover, U
j
11 (y; !) < 0
and U j12 (y; !) > 0 for j = R;S: Subscripts denote partial derivatives. Hence, for each !;
each player has a unique ideal choice yj (!) and this ideal choice is di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing in !; as dy
j(!)
d!
=  U
j
12(yj(!);!)
Uj11(y
j(!);!)
: For future reference, note that dy
j(!)
d!
 () 1 for all
! if U j1 (y; !)+U
j
2 (y; !) is nonincreasing (nondecreasing) in y: Likewise for future reference,
dene the di¤erence between the ideal choices of Sender and Receiver, that is the bias, as
b (!)  yS (!)  yR (!) :
Notice that b (!) is di¤erentiable and allowed to depend on the state !:
2.2 Known results
CS show that any Bayesian equilibrium of this game is essentially equivalent to an interval
partition of the unit interval, where Sender types within the same partition element pool on
the same message. For b (!) > 0 for all !; the Receiver takes a nite number of distinct
actions in equilibrium.
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Interval partitional equilibria are described by a partition of [0; 1] into N non-degenerate
intervals, dened by the thresholds (aN0 ; : : : ; a
N
N) such that 0 = a
N
0 < a
N
1 < : : : < a
N
N = 1.
There are N di¤erent messages needed to sustain the equilibrium, mi for i = 1; :::; N . Let
PNi =

aNi 1; a
N
i

denote the ith element of a partition with N elements. Types ! 2 PNi send
message mi and the Receivers best response to message mi is to pick the action
yi = yi
 
aNi 1; a
N
i
  argmax
y
aNiZ
aNi 1
UR (y; !) f (!) d! (1)
The overall construction is an equilibrium if indeed all types ! 2 [aNi 1; aNi ] weakly prefer
to send message mi rather than any other message mj: Given the assumed preferences, the
most tempting deviations are to mimic types in adjacent partition elements. Using (1) ; the
indi¤erence condition for type aNi reporting either ! 2 PNi (that is, sending message mi) or
! 2 PNi+1 (message mi+1) is
US
 
yi; a
N
i

= US
 
yi+1; a
N
i

: (2)
With yi as dened in (1) ; (2) forms a system of N   1 equations; initial and nal condition
are aN0 = 0 and a
N
N = 1; respectively. CS prove that for each given, and strictly positive
divergence of interests between the Sender and the Receiver, measured by the function b () ;
there is an integer N (b ()) such that (2) has at least one solution for N = f1; : : : ; N (b ())g 4:
Gordon (2010) demonstrates the existence of innite equilibria for the case where b (0) <
0 < b (1) : For convenience, I state these results in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 (Crawford and Sobel (1982)) For each b () ; where b (!) > 0 for all !; there is
N (b ()) such that (2) has at least one solution for N = f1; : : : ; N (b ())g :
(Gordon (2010)) If b (0) < 0 < b (1) ; then (2) has a solution for any N:
For the proofs of these statements, see Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Gordon (2010),
respectively. Consistently with these results, I impose the following:
4Note a slight departure of CSs notation; in CS, b is a parameter that measures the closeness of pref-
erences; here the function b () is taken to measure the di¤erence in ideal choices directly. However, this
di¤erence is purely notational.
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Assumption: b (!) is non-decreasing.
CS show that if the solutions to the system of equations (2) satisfy a monotonicity
condition (M), then there is only one solution for a given N  N (b ()) : Formally, condition
(M) requires that if (~aN0 ; : : : ; ~a
N
N) and (a^
N
0 ; : : : ; a^
N
N) are two solutions of (2) with ~a
N
0 = a^
N
0
and a^N1 > ~a
N
1 ; then a^
N
i > ~a
N
i for i  2: The known su¢ cient conditions for condition M (see
Theorem 2 in CS) are
US1 (y; !) + U
S
2 (y; !) is nondecreasing in y (3)
and
aZ
0
UR11 (y; !) f (!) d! + U
R
1 (y; a) f (a) is nonincreasing in a: (4)
2.3 The Agenda
Conditions (3) and (4) are joint restrictions on the Receivers utility function and the dis-
tribution of types. This is ne as long as the distribution is constant. To see this, recall
from CS5 that (3) and (4) hold if the distribution is uniform and there are concave functions
U
j
; for j = R;S; such that UR (y; !) = U
R
(y   !) and US (y; !) = US (y   !; b) ; where
b does not depend on !: If the distribution is nonuniform, then we can take !^  F (!) as
the state of the world and rewrite preferences using !  F 1 (!^) : If the rescaled prefer-
ences, with !^ as the state of the world, satisfy conditions (3) and (4) ; then uniqueness
of equilibria is guaranteed. An example in this spirit is when there are concave func-
tions U
R
and U
S
; respectively, such that UR (y; !) = U
R
(y   F (!)) = UR (y   !^) and
US (y; !) = U
S
(y   F (!) ; b) = US (y   !^; b) : This argument works ne as long as the dis-
tribution is constant. However, if the object of research is a comparative statics exercise that
changes the distribution of types, then the comparative statics exercise itself a¤ects whether
conditions (3) and (4) are satised. If G is an alternative distribution, then the state needs
to be rescaled with respect to the distribution G: The same preferences as a function of the
rescaled state of the world would now be written as UR (y; !) = U
R
(y   F (G 1 (!^))) ; so
the relevant derivative in condition (4) would depend on 1   f
g
; a factor that necessarily
5See their remark after their Theorem 2.
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changes sign over its domain. Thus, changing the distribution from F to G may expand the
equilibrium set.
So, if we wish to engage in comparative statics exercises involving changes in the distri-
bution of types and wish to ensure that equilibria are unique for all distributions that we
allow for, then we need separate conditions on the preferences and the distribution of types
that jointly ensure uniqueness of equilibria given N: I prove the uniqueness of equilibria of
given size N if the Sender utility function satises condition (3) ; the Receiver utility function
satises
UR1 (y; !) + U
R
2 (y; !) is nonincreasing in y (5)
and
f (!) is logconcave. (6)
Condition (5) describes a natural class of preferences for which the Receivers optimal choice
responds less than one for one to increases in the state. Condition (6) describes a natural
class of distributions, as explained in the introduction. Conditions (5) and (6) are neither
stronger nor weaker than condition (4) ; neither do conditions (5) and (6) imply condition (4)
nor is the reverse true. The rescaling argument of CS can be applied also to densities that
are not logconcave; likewise, if we take preferences UR (y; !) = U
R
(y   !) and US (y; !) =
U
S
(y   !; b) ; then (5) and (6) are satised for the whole class of logconcave densities, while
(4) holds only for the uniform distribution. For the purpose of comparative statics with
respect to the distribution of types conditions (5) and (6) have the advantage that varying
the distribution within the class of logconcave densities can never lead to multiplicity of
equilibria for given N:
Before proving uniqueness of equilibria and engaging in comparative statics, we need to
understand how the Receivers best reply reacts to changes in the information structure.
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3 The Receivers best reply and the information struc-
ture
Consider the Receivers decision problem. If he knows the state of the world, !; then he
chooses in each state of the world the act yR (!) ; dened by the condition
UR1
 
yR (!) ; !

= 0:
Consider now the Receivers decision problem, when he does not know the state of the world
precisely, but knows that ! 2 [x+; x+] ; where 0  x +  < x +  < 1: In that case
the solution to the Receivers problem becomes
y (x+; x+;h) = argmax
y
x+Z
x+
UR (y; !)h (!) d!: (7)
where h 2 f; g denote two alternative densities. x; x, ; and h describe elements of the
Receivers information structure. How does his decision depend on these objects? We are
interested in describing the class of densities for which it is true that y (x; x; g) > y (x; x; f)
for arbitrary truncations x; x:6 Moreover, we wish to know for which classes of densities it is
true that @
@
y (x+; x+)  1 for a given density f:
Lemma 2 Let f and g denote two continuous densities. We have, for any x and x such
that 0  x < x  1,
y (x; x; g) > y (x; x; f)
if and only if g
f
is strictly increasing in ! for all ! 2 [0; 1] :
If g
f
is strictly increasing in ! for all ! 2 [0; 1] then g is said to be higher in the likelihood
ratio order than f (see Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)). Thus, the Receiver believes
that the high realizations of the state are relatively more likely when the state of the world
follows the distribution with density g than when it follows the distribution with density f:
Since UR12 > 0; the Receiver responds to the change in the density from f to g by increasing
6Since  is constant in this exercise and the truncation is arbitrary, it is without loss of generality to set
 = 0 to characterize this class of densities.
10
his optimal choice. The monotone likelihood ratio property is not only su¢ cient but also
necessary by the fact that the truncation is arbitrary. If f and g are both continuous then
so is their ratio. Moreover, the monotone likelihood ratio is preserved under truncation. So,
if there is a subinterval over which g
f
is strictly decreasing, then the inequality in the lemma
would be reversed.
Consider now the second question:
Lemma 3 y (x; x) = argmaxy
xZ
x
UR (y; !) f (!) d! satises for any x and x such that 0 
x < x  1 and for any Receiver utility function such that UR1 (y; !) + UR2 (y; !) is nonin-
creasing in y
@
@x
y (x; x) +
@
@x
y (x; x)  1 (8)
if and only if f (!) is logconcave.
To understand this result, it proves useful to compare decision problem (7) with a decision
problem where where h = f and   0; which has solution
y (x; x) = argmax
y
xZ
x
UR (y; !) f (!) d!: (9)
The decision problems (9) and (7) di¤er in that the support of the random variable in the
former problem is higher than in the latter problem. Changing variables to ~! = !    in
problem (7) makes the supports of both problems equal to [x; x] and changes the integrand in
the latter problem to UR (y; ! +) f (! +) : So, there are two e¤ects when  is increased:
a direct e¤ect on the utility function and a second e¤ect that the density is changed from f (!)
to f (! +) : Consider rst the direct e¤ect for a constant density. By UR12 > 0; the Receiver
wishes to increase his optimal action when the state is higher. Since UR1 (y; !) + U
R
2 (y; !)
is nonincreasing in y; he wishes to increase his optimal action less than one for one with
increases in the state. The second e¤ect turns out to be just another incarnation of the
preceding lemma. To see this, recall from An (1998) that f (!) is logconcave if and only if
f (!0 + ) f (!00)  f (!00 + ) f (!0)
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for all !0; !00 and  such that 0  !0 < !00  !00+  1. Since I assume that the distribution
has full support, this is equivalent to
f (!0 + )
f (!00 + )
 f (!
0)
f (!00)
:
Taking   !00   !0 > 0; this is equivalent to
f (!)
f (! +)
nondecreasing in !: (10)
(10) is an upshifted likelihood ratio order.7 Thus, when the decision problem is changed
from (9) to (7), then the Receiver becomes relatively more pessimistic about the state of the
world, in the sense that he now believes high outcomes are relatively less likely than before
in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property, (10). Therefore, the e¤ect on the
Receivers optimal choice y (x+; x+) ; arising through the changed inference about the
state of the world, reinforces the e¤ect through the utility function where increases in the
state induce a less than one for one reaction in the Receivers optimal choice.
Taking the Receivers utility as a quadratic function isolates the statistical e¤ects on
the Receivers decision problem. For this utility function, we have y (x+; x+) =
E [!jx+  !  x+] and the proof of the lemma specializes then to show that
E [!jx+  !  x+]  E [!jx  !  x] + :
Rearranging, dividing by ; and taking limits as  goes to zero, we have the following
Corollary:
Corollary 1 For any x and x such that 0  x < x  1;
@
@x
E [!jx  !  x] + @
@x
E [!jx  !  x]  1 (11)
if and only if f (!) is logconcave.
7See Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007). A proof of the equivalence between the upshifted likelihood ratio
order and logconcavity appears also in Lillo et. al (2001).
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To summarize, the optimal choice y (x; x) is increased by a change in the density for
arbitrary truncations if and only if the densities satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty. y (x; x) depends on the bounds of truncation as follows: by the full support assump-
tion and the fact that UR12 > 0; I have
@
@x
y (x; x) and @
@x
y (x; x) > 0: By the lemma, I
have @
@x
y (x; x) + @
@x
y (x; x)  1: Together, these results imply also (the known result) that
@
@x
y (x; x) < 1 and @
@x
y (x; x) < 1:8
4 Uniqueness
Suppose from now on that conditions (3) ; (5) and (6) hold. These assumptions imply
uniqueness of the solution to the system (2) for givenN , whenever a solution withN partition
elements exists.
To illustrate the idea in simple terms, consider a three-partition equilibrium, which sat-
ises a30 = 0; a
3
3 = 1; and a
3
1,a
3
2 are determined by
1
 
a31; a
3
2
  US  y1  0; a31 ; a31  US  y2  a31; a32 ; a31 = 0 (12)
and
2
 
a32; a
3
1
  US  y2  a31; a32 ; a32  US  y3  a32; 1 ; a32 = 0: (13)
For given a32; equation (12) determines a
3
1; let ~1 (a
3
2) denote the solution of (12) for given a
3
2:
Likewise, equation (13) determines a32 as a function of a
3
1; let ~2 (a
3
1) denote the solution of
(13) for given a31:We can think of these functions as of best reply functions in a simultaneous
move game, where a highplayer chooses a32 2 [a31; 1] and a lowplayer chooses a31 2 [0; a32] :
Obviously, there is no such game being played, but the point is that the situation can be
8While it is well known that @@xy (x; x) < 1 and
@
@xy (x; x) < 1 for logconcave densities, to the best of my
knowledge, the equivalence between logconcavity and condition (8) has not been noted in the literature. To
be sure, not even the simpler condition (11) has been noted. Logconcave densities have been used extensively
in reliability theory, where typical questions concern the residual lifetime of an object. An (1998) and Bagnoli
and Bergstrom (2005) prove the connections between logconcave probability and various other conditions
that are frequently used in economic analysis. Reliability theory uses one-sided measures and studies, e.g.,
how a failure rate changes as an object ages. Formally, this amounts to changes in one truncation point in a
truncated distribution. In the present context, it is useful to analyze a simultaneous moving of both points
of truncation.
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analyzed as if such a game were played. An equilibrium must satisfy the following xed
point condition
a31 =
~1

~2
 
a31

: (14)
Consider the slope of the composed best replyon the right-hand side, ~01

~2 (a
3
1)

~02 (a
3
1).
By the implicit function theorem, I have ~01 (a
3
2) =
da31
da32
=
@
@a32
1(a31;a32)
  @
@a31
1(a31;a32)
and so9
da31
da32
=
US1 (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
1)
@y2
@a32
US1 (y1 (0; a
3
1) ; a
3
1)
@y1
@a31
+ US2 (y1 (0; a
3
1) ; a
3
1)  US1 (y2 (a31; a32) ; a31) @y2@a31   U
S
2 (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
1)
(15)
Likewise, ~02 (a
3
1) =
da32
da31
=
@
@a31
2(a32;a31)
  @
@a32
2(a32;a31)
and so
da32
da31
=
US1 (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
2)
@y2
@a31
US1 (y2 (a
3
2; 1) ; a
3
2)
@y2
@a32
+ US2 (y2 (a
3
2; 1) ; a
3
2)  US1 (y2 (a31; a32) ; a32) @y2@a32   U
S
2 (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
2)
:
(16)
Conditions (3) ; (5) and (6) imply that ~01 (a
3
2) 2 (0; 1) and ~02 (a31) 2 (0; 1). Since the proof
of the Theorem below discusses the arguments at length, I merely sketch the arguments
here. Consider (15) rst. The indi¤erence condition of the Sender, US (y1 (0; a31) ; a
3
1) =
US (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
1), and the fact that U
S
12 > 0; imply that y1 (0; a
3
1) < y
S (a31) < y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2).
Hence, by US11 < 0; I have U
S
1 (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
1) < 0 and thus that the numerator on the right-
hand side of (15) is positive: From conditions (5) and (6) I have
@y1(0;a31)
@a31
;
@y2(a31;a32)
@a31
< 1:
Together with condition (3) ; this implies that the denominator is negative as well. Using
these properties, I have ~01 (a
3
2) < 1 i¤
US1
 
y2
 
a31; a
3
2

; a31
@y2 (a31; a32)
@a31
+
@y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2)
@a32

+ US2
 
y2
 
a31; a
3
2

; a31

> US1
 
y1
 
0; a31

; a31
 @y1 (0; a31)
@a31
+ US2
 
y1
 
0; a31

; a31

: (17)
Again using the indi¤erence condition of the Sender, I have US1 (y1 (0; a
3
1) ; a
3
1) > 0 >
US1 (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
1) : Together with the equivalent characterization of logconcave densities
9The dependence of @yi
@a3j
for i; j = 1; 2 is suppressed for reasons of space.
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from the Lemma, (8) ; it is now easy to see that the left-hand side of this inequality is weakly
larger than US1 (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
1)+U
S
2 (y2 (a
3
1; a
3
2) ; a
3
1) while the right-hand side is strictly smaller
than US1 (y1 (0; a
3
1) ; a
3
1) + U
S
2 (y1 (0; a
3
1) ; a
3
1) : Obviously, condition (3) then implies that (17)
is indeed satised.
Virtually the same argument can be made to show that conditions (3) ; (5) and (6)
imply that ~02 (a
3
1) < 1, the only di¤erence being that now both the numerator and the
denominator in (16) are positive. Hence, logconcavity of the density implies, for the class of
Sender and Receiver utility functions considered, that the composed function ~1

~2 (a
3
1)

is a contraction mapping. This insight applies equally well to equilibria with an arbitrary
number of partition elements. I have the following Theorem:
Theorem 1 Suppose that (2) has a solution for given N: Suppose also that US1 (y; a) +
US2 (y; a) is nondecreasing in y, that U
R
1 (y; a) + U
R
2 (y; a) is nonincreasing in y and that the
distribution has a logconcave density. Then there is only one solution inducing N distinct
Receiver choices.
The formal proof in the appendix is very similar to the original one given given by CS. The
key di¤erence is the su¢ cient conditions. Consider the sequence

x; aN2 (x) ; : : : ; a
N
N 1 (x) ; 1
	
for given initial value x 2 [0; 1) : In contrast to the equilibrium sequence of thresholds
0; aN1 ; : : : ; a
N
N 1; 1
	
; aN1 is replaced by the value x: x is an initial condition for the sequence
x; aN2 (x) ; : : : ; a
N
N 1 (x) ; 1
	
and is allowed to take an arbitrary value. Clearly, the entire
sequence depends on the initial condition x: For Sender utility functions such that US1 (y; a)+
US2 (y; a) is nondecreasing in y; logconcavity of the density allows me to prove that each of
the threshold points aNi (x) for i = 2; : : : ; N 1 increases with x and does so at a rate smaller
than unity. In particular, the threshold aN2 (x) satises
daN2 (x)
dx
2 (0; 1) :
An equilibrium sequence of thresholds must satisfy in addition the condition
US
 
y1
 
aN0 ; x

; x

= US
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; x

: (18)
Condition (18) is again a xed-point condition. However, aN2 (x) depends on x in a fairly
complicated way. (18) together with US12 > 0 imply that y1
 
aN0 ; x

< yS (x) < y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

and therefore US1
 
y1
 
aN0 ; x

; x

> 0 > US1
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; x

. Using these insights, I prove
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that, for Sender utility functions such that US1 (y; a) + U
S
2 (y; a) is nondecreasing in y and
logconcave densities, the e¤ect of a change in x on the left-hand side,
US1
 
y1
 
aN0 ; x

; x
 @y1  aN0 ; x
@x
+ US2
 
y1
 
aN0 ; x

; x

is always smaller than the e¤ect of a marginal increase in x on the right-hand side,
US1
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; x
 @y2  x; aN2 (x)
@x
+
@y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

@aN2 (x)
daN2 (x)
dx
!
+ US2
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; x

:
Hence, there is at most one solution to (18) in x:10
5 Comparative statics
I now turn to comparative statics with respect to changes in the distribution of types. I rst
consider stochastically monotonic shifts and then proceed to analyze spreads in a symmetric
model.
5.1 Monotonic shifts and onesided biases
Consider an alternative distribution of the Senders type with density g (!) and cdf G (!) :
Suppose that g (!) is logconcave just as f (!) is and suppose that both communication
games with type distributions f and g; respectively, have an equilibrium inducing N distinct
Receiver actions. Let yNi (h) denote the Receivers optimal choice conditional on the density
being h and on ! 2 PNi (h) for h = f; g and let aNi (h) denote the ith threshold when the
distribution is h:
Rewriting (2) as a system of best-replyfunctions, the unique equilibrium for given N
satises
US
 
yNi (h) ; a
N
i (h)

= US
 
yNi+1 (h) ; a
N
i (h)

for i = 1; : : : ; N   1: (19)
10There is a second di¤erence to the proof in CS, which is however not important. CS consider the sequence
0; x; aN2 (x) ; : : : ; a
N
N 1 (x) ; a
N
N (x)
	
and show that there is a unique x such that aNN (x) = 1: Obviously, both
arguments are identical. The exposition given above emphasizes the connection to the xed point and
contraction mapping arguments most clearly.
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yNi (h) is an increasing function of a
N
i 1 (h) and a
N
i (h) ; y
N
i+1 (h) is an increasing function of
aNi (h) and a
N
i+1 (h) : Both functions do not directly depend on all non-adjacent thresholds
aNj (h) for j 6= i  1; i; i+ 1: As part of the proof of the Theorem below, I show that aNi (h)
is strictly increasing in aNi 1 (h) and a
N
i+1 (h) : Thus, (19) forms a system of best-response-
functions such that aNi (h) is non-decreasing in a
N
 i; the vector of the remaining thresholds
and strictly increasing in the adjacent thresholds aNi 1 (h) and a
N
i+1 (h) : Hence, we can build
on comparative statics methods developed for games with strategic complementarities (see
Vives (1990, 1999)). In particular, if the change from f to g weakly increases yNi (h) and
yNi+1 (h) ; for i = 1; : : : ; N   1; then the equilibrium thresholds in the game with density g
are higher than in the game with density f . Recalling that Lemma 2 has established that
yNi (g) > y
N
i (f) for arbitrary truncations if g is higher than f in the likelihood ratio order,
the following theorem is obvious:
Theorem 2 Suppose that two densities f and g are both logconcave. Suppose further that
the communication games when the state is distributed according to f and g; respectively,
each have an equilibrium inducing N distinct Receiver actions. If b (!) > 0 and g
f
is strictly
increasing in !; then aNi (g) > a
N
i (f) and y
N
i (g) > y
N
i (f) for i = 1; : : : ; N   1.
The strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) implies that the induced Receiver
actions when the density is g are higher than the induced Receiver actions when the density
is f for arbitrary truncations resulting from the Sender strategy. To restore the system of
indi¤erence condtions for the threshold types, (19) ; each threshold aNi needs to be increased
for given adjacent thresholds aNi 1 and a
N
i+1: Thus, changing the distribution from f to g
amounts to an upward shift of the best reply functions in a system of nondecreasing best
replies. Hence, we obtain strict monotone comparative statics.
5.2 Spreads
Spreads are more di¢ cult to analyze than (stochastically) monotonic shifts in the distribu-
tion. However, the logic behind Theorem 2 extends readily to spreads in a symmetric model.
To make the model symmetric, I restrict the density and preferences as follows:
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The density is symmetric around its mean value, one half. The Receivers utility is a
quadratic loss function
UR (y; !) =  r (y   !)2 :
where r > 0 is a constant.11 Finally, the Senders utility function is symmetric around its
bliss point, yS (!) = ! + b (!) ; so
US (y; !) = U
S
(y   (! + b (!))) :
where U
S
is strictly concave with a peak at zero. For this specication, the optimal choices
from the Receivers and the Senders perspective are yR (!) = ! and yS (!) = ! + b (!) ;
respectively, and the equilibrium condition (2) simplies to 
aNi + b
 
aNi
  E !j! 2 aNi 1; aNi  = E !j! 2 aNi ; aNi+1   aNi + b  aNi  :
b (!) satises b
 
1
2
+ 

=  b  1
2
   for all  2 0; 1
2

: Consistently with the assumptions
made above, I assume that the Senders bias is positive for values above the mean and nega-
tive for values below the mean. Obviously, I can construct a symmetric equilibrium around
the mean value one half - and I do so in the appendix. By logconcavity of the distribution,
for each given N; the equilibrium is unique. The following result is then immediate:
Theorem 3 Consider a symmetric model as outlined above and two densities f and g that
are both symmetric and logconcave. Suppose further that g
f
is strictly decreasing in ! for
! < :5 and that g
f
is strictly increasing in ! for ! > :5 and consider any equilibrium with nite
N: Then,
aNi (g)  :5  aNi (f)  :5 and yNi (g)  :5  yNi (f)  :5 for i = 1; : : : ; N 1.
11It is possible to extend the model to the generalized quadratic loss function analyzed in Alonso and
Matoushek (2008). As Alonso and Matouschek (2008) note, a game where the Receiver has a generalized
quadratic loss function with a state dependent weight r (!) can be analyzed as if the Receiver just had
a standard quadratic loss function by merging the weight r (!) with the density as follows: notice that
h (! j!1; !2 )  r (!) f (!) =
!2Z
!1
r (t) f (t) dt is a well dened probability density function for any 0  !1 <
!2  1: Using this adjusted density, the Receiver simply minimizes the standard quadratic loss function.
Note that with a state dependent weight, the merged density needs to be logconcave.
To avoid the notational clutter, I assume that r (!)  r > 0: However, it should be kept in mind, that the
results carry over in straightforward manner to the case of a state dependent weight.
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If N is even, then all inequalities are strict; if N is odd, then aNN+1
2
(f) = aNN+1
2
(g) = :5; and
all inequalities are strict but for i = N+1
2
:
The densities in the theorem satisfy a strict monotone likelihood ratio property on the
half-supports. Obviously, this ordering is not preserved under arbitrary truncations but
only under truncations on the half support. However, given symmetry it su¢ ces to rank
distributions on the half supports to tell how equilibria change when the distribution changes.
Hence, by the same rationale as in Theorem 2, the equilibrium thresholds and the induced
choices are more spread out under distribution g than under distribution f:
Obviously, symmetry is a restrictive assumption. It is well known that logconcave dis-
tributions are strongly unimodal (see Dharmadhikari and Joag-dev (1988), Theorem 1.10).
Hence, symmetric, logconcave densities have their mode at the mean. However, the assump-
tion buys a lot of tractability. In particular, better information can be modeled by more
dispersed distributions. Hence, Theorem 3 is useful to study the e¤ects of improved infor-
mation in the CS model in a fairly general way. I now derive the statistical details of such
a model.
6 The e¤ects of improved information on communica-
tion
Let both the Senders and the Receivers utility functions be quadratic, so UR (y; !) =
  (y   !)2 and US (y; !) =   (y   (! + b (!)))2 ; where b (!) = !   E! [!] for the sake of
concreteness12. Suppose that neither the Sender nor the Receiver know the state of the
world, !; however, the Sender obtains a signal, s; about the state of the world. Conditional
on s; the optimal choices of the Receiver and the Sender, respectively, are yR (s) = E! [!j s]
and yS (s) = 2E! [!j s]   E! [!] ; respectively. Expanding their utilities around these bliss
points, we can write
E!js

UR (y; !)
 s =   (y   E! [!j s])2   V ar (!j s)
12It is easy to generalize the results to nonlinear biases; this is left to the reader.
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and
E!js

UR (y; !)
 s =   (y   2E! [!j s] + E! [!])2   4V ar (!j s) ;
where V ar (!j s) is the conditional variance given s: Observe that in these expressions, only
the conditional expectation of ! given s interacts nontrivially with the decision y: Other
details of the distribution, that is the variance, a¤ect the level of utility but do not impact
on the optimal choice in each state. This suggests a change of variables, reformulating the
model in terms of communicating about what is believed to be optimal, rather than about
signals themselves.
Let z (s) denote the density of s and let q (s)  E! [!j s] denote the conditional ex-
pectation function, and suppose this function is strictly increasing and di¤erentiable in s:
Before the signal s is realized, the value that the function q (s) takes is random; let  de-
note this random variable. Since for any s^ and ^ = q (s^) ; Pr [s  s^] = Pr [q (s)  q (s^)] =
Pr
h
s  q 1

^
i
; I have
f () = z
 
q 1 ()
 1
qs (q 1 ())
;
where q 1 () denotes the inverse of the function q: Totally di¤erentiating  = q (s) and
rearranging, I have 1
qs(s)
d = ds: Thus, letting   q (s) and   q (s) ; I can write
E!;sUR (y; !) =  
Z

(y   )2 f () d   EsV ar (!j s) (20)
and
E!;sUS (y; !) =  
Z

(y   2 + E! [!])2 f () d   4EsV ar (!j s) : (21)
(20) and (21) are representations of the communication problem that are equivalent to the
original one, but much more useful. These representations make clear that the equilibrium
e¤ects of changes in the quality of information depend on how the ex ante distribution of the
conditional expectation, ; depends on the quality of information. Let the distribution with
density g () and cdf G () denote an alternative information structure. When is it true that
the alternative distribution of the conditional expectation corresponds to better information?
Blackwell (1951) provides an ordering requiring that the distribution of the posterior under
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the more informative information structure should be more risky in the sense of second
order stochastic dominance (SOSD) than under the less informative information structure.
Since  is the rst moment of the posterior, we require consistently with this notion that
Z

G () d 
Z

F () d for all : By the law of iterated expectations, it is always true that
Z

f () d =
Z

g () d = E! [!] ; implying for distributions with the same support that
Z

G () d =
Z

F () d: Obviously, this ordering provides too little structure to obtain clear
comparative statics results. Szalay (2009) imposes more structure. Let ~ = q (~s) denote the
conditional expectation arising from a signal equal to its expected value, ~s: Szalay (2009)
assumes that
G () T F () for  S ~: (22)
(22) is a mean reverting First Order Stochastic Dominance condition, implying that the
distribution g is more risky in the sense of a mean preserving spread than the distribution
f: While stronger than the Blackwell ordering, Lemma 2 and Theorem 3 suggest that the
ordering is still not strong enough for comparative statics purposes. A still stronger ordering
is obtained if we require that for 0 < 00
g (00) f (0)  () g (0) f (00) for ~  00 (~  0): (23)
(23) is stronger than (22) in the sense that for two distributions with F

~

= G

~

(which
is natural for symmetric distributions); (23) implies (22) : Note that (23) is precisely the
mean reverting monotone likelihood ratio property introduced in Theorem 3, allowing for
the case that distribution g has wider support than distribution f: Hence, the following
proposition is now obvious:
Proposition 1 Suppose that f and g are symmetric and logconcave. Moreover, suppose that
the distribution with density g corresponds to better information than the one with density f
in the sense of (23). Then, for any nite number of induced Receiver choices, N; the unique
equilibrium of the communication game is more dispersed in the sense of Theorem 3.
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The proof of this proposition follows directly from Theorem 3 and the discussion preceding
the proposition.
Proposition 1 should prove useful to analyze information acquisition in a general way. As
the discussion preceding the Proposition has shown, the ranking of information structures
is consistent with other rankings discussed in the literature. The most general treatment of
orders on the distribution of the conditional expectation is given by Ganuza and Penalva
(2010). On top of the concepts already mentioned, they study distributions that are com-
parable in the convex order and the dispersive order. As noted above the means of  under
distribution f and g, respectively, are identical. Moroever, for distributions with the same
mean, distribution g is higher in the convex order than f if and only if distribution g is a
mean preserving spread of f: Therefore, (23) also implies that distribution g is higher in the
convex order than distribution f:13
To illustrate the features of the solution, consider the following example. Suppose the
distribution of s is uniform on [0; 1] and suppose,  (!j s) ; the conditional density of ! given
s takes the form  (!j s) = 1 +   !   1
2
  
s  1
2

; where  2 (0; 4) is a parameter that
measures the informativeness of the signal s: Then, q (s) = 1
2
+ 
12
 
s  1
2

and f () = 12
a
:
Take now  2 f; g where  < : For any ; the distribution of  is uniform. For the more
informative experiment where  = ; the distribution of  has a wider support. Let a31 ()
and a31 () denote the interior thresholds of the unique three partition equilibrium for given :
It is easy to verify that these values are a31 () =
1
2
  1
168
 and a32 () =
1
2
+ 1
168
; respectively,
so the solution is indeed more spread around the mean 1
2
the higher is : While this is a
nicely tractable example, it should be stressed that nothing depends on the moving support
feature of this example. It is easy to construct examples with a non-moving support.14
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the role of the distribution of types in the strategic information trans-
mission game. I show that logconcavity of the density combined with a restriction on the
13There is no connection between the conditions studied here and the dispersive order.
14The interested reader is referred to Szalay (2009). The example given there needs to be amended in an
obvious way so as to make it work for the support [0; 1] of ! assumed here. This is left to the reader.
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Receivers utility, whereby this restriction is independent of the distributional assumption,
implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of Receiver choices. Moreover, I
provide comparative statics for distributions that can be ordered by their likelihood ratios,
showing in particular that equilibria in a communication game where the Sender has better
information are more spread out than when the Senders information is worse. I sketch a
general model to study improvements in the quality of information, which hopefully proves
useful in future applications.
While this work focusses entirely on the positive e¤ects of varying the quality of infor-
mation, in companion work (Esö and Szalay (2012)) we explore the normative aspects of
varying the quality of information. Among other things, we study incentives for information
acquisition as a function of the informativeness of equilibrium communication.
8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that g
f
is strictly increasing in ! for all ! 2 [0; 1] : The
rst-order condition for y (x; x; f) is
xZ
x
UR1 (y (x; x; f) ; !) f (!) d! = 0
To prove that y (x; x; g) > y (x; x; f) ; it su¢ ces to show that
xZ
x
UR1 (y (x; x; f) ; !) g (!) d! > 0:
Indeed, multiplying and dividing by f(!)
F (x) F (x) ; I have
(F (x)  F (x))
xZ
x
UR1 (y (x; x; f) ; !)
g (!)
f (!)
f (!)
F (x)  F (x)d!
= (F (x)  F (x))Cov

UR1 (y (x; x; f) ; !) ;
g (!)
f (!)
! 2 [x; x] ;
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where the equality uses the fact that
xZ
x
UR1 (y (x; x; f) ; !) f (!) d! = 0:Now, since U
R
12 (y; !) >
0 and g(!)
f(!)
is increasing in !; I have indeed
Cov

UR1 (y (x; x; f) ; !) ;
g (!)
f (!)
! 2 [x; x] > 0:
By concavity of the function UR (y; !) in y; y needs to be increased when the density is
changed from f to g: So, we have shown that g
f
being strictly increasing in ! for all ! 2 [0; 1]
implies that
y (x; x; g) > y (x; x; f) :
To see the converse is also true, suppose that there is an interval [x; x] such that g(!)
f(!)
is
non-increasing over that interval. This would imply that
Cov

UR1 (y (x; x; f) ; !) ;
g (!)
f (!)
! 2 [x; x]  0
and thus that y (x; x; g)  y (x; x; f) : Thus, requiring the condition to hold for arbitrary
points of truncation, x; x; makes the su¢ cient condition also necessary.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider two intervals of the same length, [x; x] and [x+; x+] :
Let y = y (x; x) solve
xZ
x
UR1 (y
; !) f (!) d! = 0
and let y () = y (x+; x+) solve
x+Z
x+
UR1 (y
 () ; !) f (!) d! = 0:
We wish to show that y ()  y +: By UR11 (y; !) < 0; this is equivalent to
x+Z
x+
UR1 (y
 +; !)
f (!)
F (x+)  F (x+)d!  0:
24
Notice that
x+Z
x+
UR1 (y
 +; !)
f (!)
F (x+)  F (x+)d! =
xZ
x
UR1 (y
 +; ! +)
f (! +)
F (x+)  F (x+)d!:
Moreover,
xZ
x
UR1 (y
 +; ! +)
f (! +)
F (x+)  F (x+)d!
=
xZ
x
UR1 (y
 +; ! +)

f (! +)
F (x+)  F (x+)  
f (!)
F (x)  F (x)

d!
+
xZ
x
UR1 (y
 +; ! +)
f (!)
F (x)  F (x)d!
Now
xZ
x
UR1 (y
 +; ! +)
f (!)
F (x)  F (x)d!
=
xZ
x
24UR1 (y; !) + Z
0
@
@z
UR1 (y
 + z; ! + z) dz
35 f (!)
F (x)  F (x)d!
=
xZ
x
24 Z
0
@
@z
UR1 (y
 + z; ! + z) dz
35 f (!)
F (x)  F (x)d!;
where the second line follows from the rst-order condition dening y: By assumption
@
@z
UR1 (y
 + z; ! + z)  0; thus the expression is maximized for a utility function that satises
@
@z
UR1 (y
 + z; ! + z) = 0; in which case it takes value zero. Hence, the overall expression is
nonpositive.
Consider now the expression
xZ
x
UR1 (y
 +; ! +)

f (! +)
F (x+)  F (x+)  
f (!)
F (x)  F (x)

d!:
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After an integration by parts, we have
xZ
x
UR1 (y
 +; ! +)

f (! +)
F (x+)  F (x+)  
f (!)
F (x)  F (x)

d!
=  
xZ
x
UR12 (y
 +; ! +)

F (! +)  F (x+)
F (x+)  F (x+)  
F (!)  F (x)
F (x)  F (x)

d!:
By UR12 (y; !)  0; UR1 (y +; ! +) is an increasing function of !: Thus, the e¤ect is
nonpositive if and only if
F (! +)  F (x+)
F (x+)  F (x+) 
F (!)  F (x)
F (x)  F (x) ; (24)
that is if the truncated distribution of ! 2 [x; x] dominates the truncated distribution of
! 2 [x+; x+] in the sense of First Order Stochastic Dominance.
As argued in the text, a fully supported density f (!) is logconcave if and only if for
 > 0, f(!)
f(!+)
is nondecreasing in !: Hence, for a logconcave density
@
@!
f(!)
F (x) F (x)
f(!+)
F (x+) F (x+)
 0: (25)
By Milgrom (1981), the monotone likelihood ratio property, (25) ; implies First Order Sto-
chastic Dominance, (24) : This establishes su¢ ciency of the conditions.
To establish necessity, suppose there is an interval [x; x] over which (10) fails to hold, so
that f(!)
f(!+)
is decreasing in ! over that interval. Suppose we choose in addition a utility
function such that @
@z
UR1 (y + z; ! + z) = 0: Then, both inequalities in conditions (25) and
(24) are reversed, and in fact hold as strict inequalities. Thus, for this construction we would
have y () > y +:
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that, for all Receiver utility functions such that dy
R(!)
d!
 1;
logconcavity of f (!) is equivalent to
@
@x
yi (x; x) +
@
@x
yi (x; x)  1 (26)
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for for all x; x such that 0  x < x  1:
Suppose there is an equilibrium inducing N distinct Receiver actions, i.e., the system (2)
has a solution with initial condition aN0 and given end point a
N
N = 1: It is useful to split (2)
into two sets. For arbitrary initial condition x 2 [0; 1) split the conditions into
US
 
y1
 
aN0 ; x

; x

= US
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; x

(27)
on the one hand and
US
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; aN2 (x)

= US
 
y3
 
aN2 (x) ; a
N
3 (x)

; aN2 (x)

(28)
US
 
yi
 
aNi 1 (x) ; a
N
i (x)

; aNi (x)

= US
 
yi+1
 
aNi (x) ; a
N
i+1 (x)

; aNi (x)

(29)
for i = 3; : : : ; N   2; and
US
 
yN 1
 
aNN 2 (x) ; a
N
N 1 (x)

; aNN 1 (x)

= US
 
yN
 
aNN 1 (x) ; a
N
N

; aNN 1 (x)

(30)
on the other hand.
x can be viewed as an initial condition to the system given by (28) ; (29) ; and (30) :
When we require x to satisfy (27) as well, then x is forced to take its equilibrium value. To
prove the result, we need to show that (27) has exactly one solution in x: Di¤erentiating
(27) ; we nd that the e¤ect of a marginal increase in x on the left-hand side is
US1
 
y1
 
aN0 ; x

; x
 @y1  aN0 ; x
@x
+ US2
 
y1
 
aN0 ; x

; x

while the e¤ect of a marginal increase in x on the right-hand side is
US1
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; x
 @y2  x; aN2 (x)
@x
+
@y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

@aN2 (x)
daN2 (x)
dx
!
+ US2
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; x

I now show that the latter e¤ect always dominates the former, using the implications of
logconcavity from the Lemma and showing that da
N
2 (x)
dx
2 (0; 1) : In turn, to show that daN2 (x)
dx
2
(0; 1) ; I need to show how the entire sequence

aN2 (x) ; : : : ; a
N
N 1 (x)
	
changes with the initial
condition x:
In what follows I suppress the dependence of yi on its arguments where this is needed for
reasons of space.
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By smoothness of the Receivers optimal choice as a function of the threshold values, the
systems solution varies smoothly in the initial condition x: Di¤erentiating (30) totally with
respect to aNN 2 and a
N
N 1 we obtain
daNN 1
daNN 2
=
US1
 
yN 1; aNN 1
 @yN 1
@aNN 2
US1
 
yN ; aNN 1

@yN
@aNN 1
+ US2
 
yN ; aNN 1
  US1  yN 1; aNN 1 @yN 1@aNN 1   US2  yN 1; aNN 1 :
(31)
The Senders indi¤erence condition, US
 
yN 1; aNN 1

= US
 
yN ; a
N
N 1

; implies that yN 1
 
aNN 2; a
N
N 1

<
yS
 
aNN 1

< yN
 
aNN 1; a
N
N

and thus that US1
 
yN ; a
N
N 1

< 0 < US1
 
yN 1; aNN 1

: Therefore,
the numerator is positive. The denominator is positive i¤
US1
 
yN ; a
N
N 1
 @yN
@aNN 1
+ US2
 
yN ; a
N
N 1

> US1
 
yN 1; aNN 1
 @yN 1
@aNN 1
+ US2
 
yN 1; aNN 1

:
By the now familiar arguments, the left-hand side is bounded below by and strictly larger
than US1
 
yN ; a
N
N 1

+US2
 
yN ; a
N
N 1

; while the right-hand side is bounded above by and
strictly smaller than US1
 
yN 1; aNN 1

+US2
 
yN 1; aNN 1

: So, for a function such that US1 (y; a)+
US2 (y; a) is nondecreasing in y; the denominator is positive, so
daNN 1
daNN 2
> 0: Using that the
denominator is positive, I have
daNN 1
daNN 2
< 1 i¤
US1
 
yN 1; aNN 1
@yN 1
@aNN 2
+
@yN 1
@aNN 1

+US2
 
yN 1; aNN 1

< US1
 
yN ; a
N
N 1
 @yN
@aNN 1
+US2
 
yN ; a
N
N 1

:
The left-hand side is weakly smaller than US1
 
yN 1; aNN 1

+US2
 
yN 1; aNN 1

while the right-
hand side is strictly larger than US1
 
yN ; a
N
N 1

+US2
 
yN ; a
N
N 1

: So, for a function such that
US1 (y; a) + U
S
2 (y; a) is nondecreasing in y; I have
daNN 1
daNN 2
< 1:
Di¤erentiating (29) totally, and substituting for
daNi 1
daNi+1
=
daNi 1
daNi
daNi
daNi+1
;
I have
daNi
daNi 1
=
US1
 
yi; a
N
i

@yi
@aNi 1
US1 (yi+1; a
N
i )

@yi+1
@aNi
+ @yi+1
@aNi+1
daNi+1
daNi

+ US2 (yi+1; a
N
i )  US1 (yi; aNi ) @yi@aNi   U
S
2 (yi; a
N
i )
:
(32)
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I can now show by induction that
daNi+1
daNi
2 (0; 1) implies that daNi
daNi 1
2 (0; 1) :
By the Senders indi¤erence condition, I have yi
 
aNi 1; a
N
i

< yS
 
aNi

< yi+1
 
aNi ; a
N
i+1

;
and thus US1
 
yi
 
aNi 1; a
N
i

; aNi

> 0 > US1
 
yi+1
 
aNi ; a
N
i+1

; aNi

: Hence, the numerator on
the right-hand side of (32) is positive. The denominator on the right hand side of (32) is
positive i¤
US1
 
yi+1; a
N
i
@yi+1
@aNi
+
@yi+1
@aNi+1
daNi+1
daNi

+ US2
 
yi+1; a
N
i

> US1
 
yi; a
N
i
 @yi
@aNi
+ US2
 
yi; a
N
i

Suppose that
daNi+1
daNi
2 (0; 1) : Then, I have
@yi+1
 
aNi ; a
N
i+1

@aNi
+
@yi+1
 
aNi ; a
N
i+1

@aNi+1
daNi+1
daNi
< 1
and thus that the left-hand side is strictly larger than US1
 
yi+1; a
N
i

+US2
 
yi+1; a
N
i

: The
right-hand side is strictly smaller than US1
 
yi; a
N
i

+US2
 
yi; a
N
i

: Hence, for a function such
that US1 (y; a)+U
S
2 (y; a) is nondecreasing in y; the denominator is positive. Hence,
daNi
daNi 1
< 1
i¤
US1
 
yi; a
N
i
 @yi
@aNi 1
+
@yi
@aNi

+US2
 
yi; a
N
i

< US1
 
yi+1; a
N
i
@yi+1
@aNi
+
@yi+1
@aNi+1
daNi+1
daNi

+US2
 
yi+1; a
N
i

:
(33)
By the now familiar argument, this holds true for a function such that US1 (y; a)+U
S
2 (y; a) is
nondecreasing in y: Therefore, the inductive hypotheses,
daNi+1
daNi
2 (0; 1) ; implies that daNi
daNi 1
2
(0; 1) : This argument shows that da
N
i
daNi 1
2 (0; 1) for i = 3; : : : ; N   2: Note in particular, that
the argument implies that da
N
3
daN2
2 (0; 1) :
Finally, consider (28) : Totally di¤erentiating the condition and substituting for
daN3
dx
=
daN3
daN2
daN2
dx
I obtain I have
daN2
dx
=
US1
 
y2; a
N
2

@y2
@x
US1 (y3; a
N
2 )
@y3
@aN2
+ US1 (y3; a
N
2 )
@y3
@aN3
daN3
daN2
+ US2 (y3; a
N
2 )  US1 (y2; aN2 ) @y2@aN2   U
S
2 (y2; a
N
2 )
:
(34)
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By the now familiar arguments y2
 
x; aN2

< yS
 
aN2

< y3
 
aN2 ; a
N
3

and hence US1
 
y2; a
N
2

>
0 > US1
 
y3; a
N
2

: Hence, (34) has got the exact same structure as (32) has, and hence I have
daN2
dx
2 (0; 1) :
Hence we have shown that there is a unique x; such that
US
 
y1
 
aN0 ; x

; x

= US
 
y2
 
x; aN2 (x)

; x

(35)
for x = x; where aN2 (x) is determined by (28) ; (29) ; and (30) :
Since N is arbitrary in this argument, we have shown that for any N; there is at most
one solution to (2) :
Proof of Theorem 2. The equilibrium of the game is the initial condition aN0 (h) = 0;
the nal condition aNN (h) = 1; together with the system of equations
US
 
yNi (h) ; a
N
i (h)

= US
 
yNi+1 (h) ; a
N
i (h)

for i = 1; : : : ; N   1: (36)
for i = 1; : : : ; N   1:
Totally di¤erentiating (19) with respect to aNi and a
N
i 1 -suppressing the dependence of
these values on h for brevity - I obtain
daNi
daNi 1
=
US1
 
yNi ; a
N
i
 @yNi
@aNi 1
US1
 
yNi+1; a
N
i
 @yNi+1
@aNi
+ US2
 
yNi+1; a
N
i
  US1 (yNi ; aNi ) @yNi@aNi   US2 (yNi ; aNi ) :
By the fact that yNi < y
S
 
aNi

< yNi+1; I have U
S
1
 
yNi ; a
N
i

> 0 > US1
 
yNi+1; a
N
i

: Hence, the
numerator is positive. Moreover, since
@yNi+1
@aNi
;
@yNi
@aNi
2 (0; 1) ; the denominator is strictly larger
than
US1
 
yNi+1; a
N
i

+ US2
 
yNi+1; a
N
i
  US1  yNi ; aNi   US2  yNi ; aNi  > 0;
where the conclusion follows from the fact that US1 (y; a) + U
S
2 (y; a) is nondecreasing in y:
Hence, da
N
i
daNi 1
> 0: An identical argument can be given to show that da
N
i
daNi+1
> 0: So, aNi is
increasing in aNi 1 and a
N
i+1:
Suppose that, for any given sequence of thresholds, yNi (g) > y
N
i (f) and y
N
i+1 (g) >
yNi+1 (f) for i = 1; : : : ; N  1: The equilibrium condition for the thresholds under distribution
f is
US
 
yNi (f) ; a
N
i (f)

= US
 
yNi+1 (f) ; a
N
i (f)

:
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Keep now the sequence unchanged, but change the distribution from f to g and adjust the
Receivers choices accordingly to
yNi (f; g)  yNi
 
aNi 1 (f) ; a
N
i (f) ; g

and
yNi+1 (f; g) = y
N
i
 
aNi (f) ; a
N
i+1 (f) ; g

To prove that aNi (g) > a
N
i (f) ; we need to show that
US
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
  US  yNi+1 (f; g) ; aNi (f) > 0:
To show this, we rst establish that yNi (f; g) < y
S
 
aNi (f)

< yNi+1 (f; g) : Since y
N
i+1 (f; g) >
yNi+1 (f) and y
N
i+1 (f) > y
S
 
aNi (f)

; the second inequality is trivially satised. So, it su¢ ces
to show that yNi (f; g) < y
S
 
aNi (f)

: For b (!) > 0; we have yR
 
aNi (f)

< yS
 
aNi (f)

:
For any aNi 1 < a
N
i ; we have y
N
i
 
aNi 1; a
N
i

< yR
 
aNi

: Therefore, it follows that yNi (f; g) <
yS
 
aNi (f)

: Thus, we have shown that US1
 
y; aNi (f)

> 0 for all y 2 yNi (f) ; yNi (f; g) and
US1
 
y; aNi (f)

< 0 for all y 2 yNi+1 (f) ; yNi+1 (f; g) : Notice that
US
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
  US  yNi+1 (f; g) ; aNi (f)
= US
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
  US  yNi+1 (f; g) ; aNi (f)   US  yNi (f) ; aNi (f)  US  yNi+1 (f) ; aNi (f)
=
yNi (f;g)Z
yNi (f)
US1
 
y; aNi (f)

dy  
Z yNi+1(f;g)
yNi+1(f)
US1
 
y; aNi (f)

dy:
The rst equality follows from the fact that US
 
yNi (f) ; a
N
i (f)
 US  yNi+1 (f) ; aNi (f) = 0;
the second from the fundamental theorem of di¤erentiation. By the arguments just made,
we have
yNi (f;g)Z
yNi (f)
US1
 
y; aNi (f)

dy  
Z yNi+1(f;g)
yNi+1(f)
US1
 
y; aNi (f)

dy > 0:
The next step is to show that US
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
   US  yNi+1 (f; g) ; aNi (f) is decreasing
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in aNi (f) : Di¤erentiating the di¤erence, we have
@
@aNi (f)

US
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
  US  yNi+1 (f; g) ; aNi (f)
= US1
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
 @yNi (f; g)
@aNi (f)
+ US2
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)

 US1
 
yNi+1 (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
 @yNi+1 (f; g)
@aNi (f)
  US2
 
yNi+1 (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)

By the now familiar arguments, we have
@
@aNi (f)

US
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
  US  yNi+1 (f; g) ; aNi (f)
< US1
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)

+ US2
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
  US1  yNi+1 (f; g) ; aNi (f)  US2  yNi+1 (f; g) ; aNi (f)
 0;
where the last inequality uses that US1 (y; a)+U
S
2 (y; a) is nondecresing in y: So, U
S
 
yNi (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)
 
US
 
yNi+1 (f; g) ; a
N
i (f)

is indeed decreasing in aNi (f) : Hence, to reset the di¤erence equal
to zero, we need to increase aNi (f) : Hence, a
N
i (g) > a
N
i (f) :
Proof of Theorem 3. To prove the theorem, I construct symmetric equilibria and
show that the equilibrium thresholds in such symmetric equilibria are more spread out for
distribution g.
Part i: symmetric equilibria.
There are two cases to distinguish: a) N is even and b) N is odd. I provide a detailed
proof of case a and sketch the argument for case b:
a) Suppose N is even. In a symmetric equilibrium, aNN
2
(h) = :5 for h = f; g: Consider
now the half-support for !  :5 and ignore the thresholds aNi (h) for i > N2 for the time
being. In what follows I suppress the dependence of the thresholds on the distribution
where this can be done without creating confusion. Dene !Ni = E

!j! 2 aNi 1; aNi  and
!Ni+1 = E

!j! 2 aNi ; aNi+1 : Suppose the thresholds aNi for i  N2 are a solution to (2) with
initial condition aN0 = 0 and nal condition a
N
N
2
(h) = :5; thus - using the fact that utilities
are quadratic -  
aNi + b
 
aNi
  !Ni = !Ni+1    aNi + b  aNi 
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for i = 1; : : : ; N
2
  1: Letting i  :5  aNi ; I can write
(:5  i + b (:5  i))  !Ni = !Ni+1   (:5  i + b (:5  i))
for i = 1; : : : ; N
2
  1: Rearranging, I have
( i + b (:5  i)) + :5  !Ni + :5  !Ni+1 =   ( i + b (:5  i)) (37)
Let now j (i) = N
2
+
 
N
2
  i = N   i and j  aNj   :5: We wish to show that (37) implies
that  
aNj(i) + b
 
aNj(i)
  !Nj(i) = !Nj(i)+1    aNj(i) + b  aNj(i)
for i = 1; : : : ; N
2
 1 describes an equilibrium sequence of thresholds on the upper half-support.
Substituting for j
(j + :5 + b (j + :5))  !Nj = !Nj+1   (j + :5 + b (j + :5))
and rearranging
(j + b (j + :5)) = !
N
j   :5 + !Nj+1   :5  (j + b (j + :5)) : (38)
Clearly, for i = j, I have :5   !Ni = !Nj   :5 and :5   !Ni+1 = !Nj+1   :5 by symmetry of
the distribution. Moreover, (38) characterizes an equilibrium sequence of thresholds for the
upper half support i¤
2i   2b (:5  i) = 2j + 2b (j + :5) ;
which is satised since b (:5  ) = b ( + :5) :
b) N is odd. In this case I take aNN+1
2
 1 as a given nal condition on the lower half of
the support and aNN+1
2
as a given initial condition on the upper half of the support. The
equilibrium construction works in two steps. In the rst step, aNN+1
2
 1 and a
N
N+1
2
are arbitrary
but for the requirement that aNN+1
2
  :5 = :5   aNN+1
2
 1: Given this restriction, I can apply
the argument of part a) to the supports
h
0; aNN+1
2
 1
i
and
h
aNN+1
2
; 1
i
: In the second step, the
distance aNN+1
2
 :5 is adjusted to make the entire construction an equilibrium. This establishes
that, given uniqueness, the equilibrium must be symmetric.
Part ii: equilibria are more spread out under distribution g:
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Consider rst the case where N is even. I can apply Theorem 2 to the half-supports
0; 1
2

, since for any symmetric equilibrium with N even I have aNN
2
(h) = :5: It follows that
aNi (g) < a
N
i (f) for i <
N
2
: The properties on the upper half-support follow from the fact
that the distribution and bias are symmetric around the mean, thus aNi (g) > a
N
i (f) for
i > N
2
:
For the case where N is odd, consider rst the supports
h
0; aNN+1
2
 1 (f)
i
and
h
aNN+1
2
(f) ; 1
i
where the bounds aNN+1
2
 1 (f) and a
N
N+1
2
(f) are the equilibrium thresholds for the distribution
f: Note that theses thresholds satisfy t aNN+1
2
(f)  :5 = :5 aNN+1
2
 1 (f) : Applying Theorem 2
to these supports, I nd that for given nal conditionaNN+1
2
 1 (f) ; changing the distribution
from f to g; shifts all the conditional means i = 1; : : : ; N+1
2
  1 and all the threshold types
i = 1; : : : ; N+1
2
  2 downwards. By symmetry, all conditional means and thresholds types
i = N+1
2
+1; : : : ; N 1 are shifted upwards for given aNN+1
2
(f) : Note that the truncated mean
over the interval
h
aNN+1
2
 1 (f) ; a
N
N+1
2
(f)
i
is by symmetry equal to :5:
By the fact that the initial construction is an equilibrium under distribution f; I have
aNN+1
2
 1 (f) + b

aNN+1
2
 1 (f)

  !NN+1
2
 1 (f) = :5 

aNN+1
2
 1 (f) + b

aNN+1
2
 1 (f)

;
where I have substituted !NN+1
2
= :5: Changing the distribution to g; I have
aNN+1
2
 1 (f) + b

aNN+1
2
 1 (f)

  !NN+1
2
 1 (g) > :5 

aNN+1
2
 1 (f) + b

aNN+1
2
 1 (f)

;
since !NN+1
2
 1 (g) < !
N
N+1
2
 1 (f) by the argument made above. By logconcavity, the left-hand
side is non-decreasing in aNN+1
2
 1; the right-hand side is decreasing in a
N
N+1
2
 1: Hence, decreas-
ing aNN+1
2
 1 decreases the left-hand side and increases the right-hand side, so a
N
N+1
2
 1 (g) <
aNN+1
2
 1 (f) :
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